The Türkiye-Libya Maritime Memorandum of 27 November 2019: Reading the Text and Its UN Filing

Why It Matters

The Memorandum of Understanding on the Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean was signed on 2019-11-27 in Istanbul by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Fayez al-Sarraj, chair of the Presidency Council of Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA). It sets one maritime boundary line between Türkiye's south-western coast and Libya's north-eastern coast, covering both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It matters because it turned a long-running Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean argument over islands, equity and third-party rights into a dispute that involves the EU, Egypt and the UN system. Readers looking for a Turkey Libya maritime memorandum 2019 explained in document terms should keep three questions apart: what the text delimits, what legal form it has, and who may contest it.

Background

What the text delimits

The instrument is a short bilateral text with a coordinate list. It connects points on the sea between two states with opposite coasts and states that the parties' maritime jurisdiction areas are delimited by that line. Its preamble invokes international law, including the law of the sea, and the principle of equity. Readers should consult the full text as published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and in UN channels rather than rely on press summaries or maps, since many circulating maps are illustrative and not part of the instrument.

Three features matter for analysis:

• Opposite coasts. The line is drawn between the Turkish mainland and the Libyan mainland, not between islands.
• No third-state boundaries. The text purports to fix the Türkiye–Libya boundary only. It does not purport to delimit anything with Greece, Egypt or Cyprus.
• Equity as the stated method. The line is presented as an equitable result, not as a strict median line between all land territory.

Legal form

The document is styled a memorandum of understanding, a title that in some legal systems implies a non-binding political commitment. Ankara and its Libyan counterpart treated it as a binding international agreement and moved it through domestic procedures in December 2019. Greece and several EU members argue that a text styled in this way, concluded by a government whose authority was contested, cannot produce legal effect. The label alone does not decide the issue: under general treaty law, intent and content matter more than title. For the wider Treaty Vault method of reading texts, see The Treaty Vault: Reading Lausanne, Kars, Montreux and the UN Charter as Primary Texts.

Chronology

For the wider dated record, see Blue Homeland Files: A Dated Document Chronology from the 2004 UN Filings to the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration.

The UN filing

Two separate steps are often confused.

1. Communication of the memorandum. After signature, the text was transmitted to the UN Secretary-General. Registration or deposit at the UN Secretariat under Article 102 of the UN Charter is an administrative act. The UN has long stated that registering an instrument does not confer the status of treaty on it, nor does it endorse its content. Treaties not registered cannot be invoked before UN organs, which is why states register.
2. The 2020-03-18 outer-limit registration. Türkiye is not a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), so it does not make a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Instead, Ankara notified the Secretary-General of the outer limits it claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece and others stress that such a notification creates no entitlement by itself; Ankara treats it as an official record of its position and of its reading of overlaps with the Libyan zone.

The UN filing therefore functions as a public record and a diplomatic marker, not as an adjudication. Both camps use that record: each side cites it to show it objected on time.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the memorandum is legally void because it disregards the maritime zones that Greek islands generate under Article 121 of UNCLOS, and in particular Crete, which lies between the two mainland coasts. Athens also argues that the text was concluded by a government that lacked the constitutional authority to bind Libya, citing the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. Greece expelled the Libyan ambassador in December 2019. Its legal case rests on the ICJ's statement in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012) that Article 121 reflects customary law, and on the 2020 Greece–Egypt agreement.

Egypt

Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that the memorandum has no legal effect on Egypt and objected to it in communications to the UN. Cairo links its position to its own claim to rights on its north-western maritime frontier with Libya and to its 2020 agreement with Greece, which it presents as a lawful partial delimitation.

Cyprus

The Republic of Cyprus, which Ankara refers to as the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), has objected through notes to the UN and EU statements. It states that the memorandum infringes its sovereign rights and that it violates the law of the sea. It points to its own 2003 EEZ agreement with Egypt. Türkiye rejects these claims on behalf of both itself and the Turkish Cypriots, who argue they hold equal rights over offshore resources.

European Union

The European Council conclusions of 12–13 December 2019 state that the memorandum 'infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States'. EU institutions have repeated this in later statements and in the context of the 2022 hydrocarbon memorandum. Ankara counters that the EU is not a party to the delimitation and has no competence to adjudicate maritime boundaries.

Libya's internal division

Libyan institutions have not spoken with one voice. The House of Representatives in the east has rejected the memorandum, while authorities in Tripoli have defended it. Any reader should check the status of Libyan ratification and domestic positions at the date of reading, because they have shifted with Libya's political divisions. Libya is a party to UNCLOS; Türkiye is not.

The Legal Contest

Islands and equity

The central legal question is how much weight Greek islands, especially Crete, should receive when a boundary is drawn between Türkiye and Libya. Greece answers that UNCLOS Article 121(2) gives islands full zones like other land territory, and that the ICJ has described Article 121 as customary law. Türkiye answers that Article 121 defines entitlement, not delimitation, and that equity decides the effect of an island in a boundary. Case law supports both sides in part: islands have been given full effect in some cases and reduced effect or none in others, depending on size, position and coastal geography. The dispute therefore turns on facts and weighting, not on a simple rule.

Can third parties contest it?

This is the most contested question. On one reading, a delimitation agreement cannot bind or harm third states. Therefore, if Greece has overlapping entitlements, the memorandum cannot extinguish them, and Greece may state that it does not recognise the line. On another reading, a state with no maritime entitlement in an area lacks standing to object. Ankara contends that Greek claims to a zone reaching across to Libya depend on giving Crete and other islands full effect, which is the very point at issue. International courts have usually limited their rulings to areas where no third state has a claim, as in Libya/Malta (1985), which illustrates how third-state interests are handled when courts rule.

Source Comparison

Sister publications cover the same dispute from different angles: Archive of Nations sets out the text, legal basis and objections; Borders & Blocs compares it with the Seville Map; Region Scope discusses the legal basis and impact; and Crossroads Review explains the wider Blue Homeland framework. For how Politi Archive sorts documents from interpretation, see Editorial Principles.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a state's coast; rights exist inherently and do not depend on declaration.
• Exclusive economic zone (EEZ): a zone up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) from the baselines in which the coastal state holds sovereign rights over resources.
• Equity principle: the requirement that a delimitation produce an equitable result, considering coastal geography and proportionality.
• Res inter alios acta: a principle that an agreement does not create obligations or rights for third parties.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): the Turkish doctrine of maritime jurisdiction across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
• UNCLOS: the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; Türkiye is not a party, while Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Libya are.

Related guides: Blue Homeland Files, The Treaty Vault, The Cyprus Record, Politi Archive FAQ, and the sister analysis from Regions & Powers.

Perspective Note

Politi Archive presents analysis from a Türkiye-aligned perspective, grounded in Türkiye's official doctrines and international law arguments, and clearly distinguishes documented fact from interpretation. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, state archives and official statements, which are cited so readers can verify them independently.

Politi Archive Editorial Team