Montreux Article 19 in Practice: How Türkiye Applied the Straits Regime to Warships in the Russia-Ukraine War
How Türkiye applied Montreux Convention Article 19 to warships in the Ukraine war: the text, the 2022 notification, return-to-base rule, and rival readings.
Why It Matters
Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention says that when Türkiye is not a belligerent, warships of states at war may not pass through the Turkish Straits, except for a narrow set of exceptions and a right to return to their home bases. Türkiye invoked this rule in late February 2022, shortly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and states that it applied it to every belligerent. Because the Black Sea fleets of Russia and of other littoral states were already inside the sea, the decision mainly froze reinforcement from outside, which is why it remains central to Black Sea balance and to debates about the Convention's future.
Background
What the Convention says
The Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits was signed at Montreux on 20 July 1936 and entered into force later that year. It replaced the Straits arrangements of the 1923 Lausanne settlement and restored full Turkish control over the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, including the right to remilitarize them. The articles most relevant to a war are these:
| Provision | What it does (paraphrased) | Why it mattered in 2022 |
|---|---|---|
| Articles 2 and 5 | Merchant vessels enjoy freedom of transit in peacetime, and also in wartime when Türkiye is not a belligerent | Grain and commercial traffic follow this track, not Article 19 |
| Articles 10–18 | Peacetime rules for warships: advance notification, class and tonnage limits for non-Black Sea states, and a limited stay in the Black Sea | Set the baseline that Article 19 modifies for belligerents |
| Article 19 | When Türkiye is not at war, warships of belligerent states may not transit, except in the cases described below; ships separated from their bases may return; no captures, visit-and-search or hostile acts in the Straits | The provision Ankara invoked |
| Articles 20 and 21 | If Türkiye is itself at war, or considers itself threatened with imminent danger of war, passage of warships is left to Turkish discretion | Not invoked in 2022 |
| Article 25 | The Convention does not prejudice obligations arising from the League of Nations Covenant or from mutual-assistance treaties | Basis for the League-era exception in Article 19 |
The exceptions in Article 19 relate to the Covenant of the League of Nations and to assistance rendered to a state victim of aggression under a mutual-assistance treaty concluded within the Covenant framework. Legal commentators debate whether this League-era wording retains practical content after the League's dissolution in 1946. The text of the Convention is among the primary documents read in The Treaty Vault: Reading Lausanne, Kars, Montreux and the UN Charter as Primary Texts.
The 2022 timeline
| Date (ISO) | Event |
|---|---|
| 2022-02-24 | Russia launches its full-scale invasion of Ukraine; the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) calls it unacceptable and a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity |
| 2022-02-26 to 27 | Ukrainian officials publicly ask Ankara to close the Straits to Russian warships |
| 2022-02-27 to 28 | Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu says the situation has become a war and announces that Türkiye will implement Article 19, informing both littoral and non-littoral states not to send warships through |
| 2022-03-10 | Çavuşoğlu hosts the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers in Antalya, on the margins of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum |
| 2022-03-29 | Russian and Ukrainian delegations meet in Istanbul for negotiations |
| 2022-07-22 | Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine sign the Istanbul arrangements creating the Black Sea Grain Initiative, with a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul |
| 2023-07-17 | Russia declines to extend the grain arrangement; the initiative lapses |
| 2024-01-11 | Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria sign an agreement on a joint mine countermeasures task group in the Black Sea |
Treat the exact wording and sequence of the February 2022 announcements as something to check against the MFA's own statements and archived press conferences; media accounts differ in detail on which ships requested passage and what happened to each.
The return-to-base clause in practice
Article 19 does not leave ships stranded: warships of belligerents that have become separated from their bases may return to them. In 2022 this was the practical flashpoint, because some Russian vessels from outside the Black Sea were reported to be on or near the route. Ankara said it would assess such cases against the text, and both Moscow and Western observers watched for any sign of inconsistent treatment. Public reporting on individual ship decisions is uneven, so this article does not rely on unverified counts.
Key Players & Positions
Ukraine
Kyiv sought the closure of the Straits to Russian warships in the first days of the war and has since described the Montreux regime as helpful but insufficient, since Russia's Black Sea Fleet was already based in the sea. Ukrainian officials have also welcomed Türkiye's mediation and its participation in the grain arrangement.
Russia
Russian officials have generally said that Moscow respects the Convention and expects Türkiye to apply it as written, including the return-to-base provision. Russia has historically opposed proposals to revise Montreux, and it treats the regime as a long-standing guarantee against a larger Western naval presence in the Black Sea.
NATO and Western governments
NATO and several allied governments have publicly treated Türkiye's implementation as consistent with the Convention. At the same time, Western analysts note a trade-off: the regime that limits Russian reinforcement also limits allied naval access, particularly through the Article 18 tonnage and stay limits for non-Black Sea powers. Romania and Bulgaria, as NATO littoral states, have favoured a stronger allied presence, while Ankara has emphasized littoral-state responsibility for Black Sea security.
Türkiye
Ankara's own account is set out in the next section and is attributed to Turkish official sources.
Where the readings diverge
- Who decides that a war exists: Ankara, as the territorial state, assessed the situation and made the determination; critics ask for clearer criteria, while supporters note the Convention places the practical application with Türkiye.
- Scope of the return-to-base right: it is stated in the text but not defined in detail, leaving room for differing views on how to apply it.
- The League-era exception: whether any current treaty could trigger it is contested.
- Merchant shipping: Article 19 does not cover it, which is why grain exports depended on a separate negotiated arrangement.
Türkiye's Position on the Record
- Montreux is implemented impartially and in full. According to the Turkish MFA and statements by Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu in late February 2022, Türkiye applied Article 19 to all belligerents, whether or not they border the Black Sea. Ankara describes this as transparent, text-based application rather than a political choice for either side.
- Condemnation of the invasion and support for Ukraine's territorial integrity. The MFA statement of 24 February 2022 rejected the invasion as unacceptable. Türkiye maintains that it does not recognize the annexation of Crimea, and Presidency statements have repeated support for Ukraine's sovereignty alongside an open channel to Moscow.
- Legal basis in 1923 and 1936. Ankara argues that the Lausanne settlement had left the Straits under an international commission and a demilitarized regime, and that Montreux restored Turkish sovereignty while preserving free commercial passage. For that reason Türkiye treats the Convention as a balanced, still valid instrument and has opposed revising it.
- Montreux and mediation are complementary. Ankara links the Straits regime to its diplomacy: the Antalya meeting of 10 March 2022, the Istanbul talks of 29 March 2022 and the 22 July 2022 Istanbul arrangements, which the Turkish side describes as a contribution to global food security. The initiative delivered roughly 33 million tonnes of grain by the Turkish and UN accounting before it lapsed in July 2023.
- Black Sea security is a littoral responsibility. Presidency and MFA statements stress that the littoral states bear primary responsibility for Black Sea security. The January 2024 mine countermeasures agreement with Romania and Bulgaria is presented as an example of that approach.
These points reflect Ankara's stated policy; the primary documents are the Convention text, the MFA statements of February 2022 and the Istanbul agreement texts. For the wider diplomatic frame, see ‘The World Is Bigger Than Five’: Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Thesis in the Record. For the maritime-law side of Ankara's record, see Blue Homeland Files: A Dated Document Chronology from the 2004 UN Filings to the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration.
Source Comparison
| Question | Turkish primary sources | Russian framing | Ukrainian framing | Western and international framing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What did Türkiye do? | MFA and Çavuşoğlu: applied Article 19 to all belligerents, in line with the text | Türkiye is bound to honour the Convention, including return to base | A helpful step, but late and incomplete | Largely consistent with Montreux; debate over the limited practical effect |
| Is the regime neutral? | Yes: applied impartially | Yes, as long as the return-to-base clause is respected | Not neutral in effect, because Russian forces were already in the sea | Neutral in text; uneven in effect for allied access |
| Role of the Convention | Stable balance; no revision | Guarantee against outside naval build-up | Needs political reinforcement | Valuable but dated; some call for review |
| Link to grain | Separate track; Istanbul diplomacy complements Montreux | Grain arrangement tied to sanctions demands | Essential for exports and food security | UN-Türkiye brokered; cited as a diplomatic success until 2023 |
Readers can check each column against the Convention text, official MFA releases and the UN's published materials on the Istanbul arrangements. Our approach to sourcing is set out in Editorial Principles: How Politi Archive Handles Sources, Facts and Perspective.
Sister publications have also covered the topic: The Political Anatomy explains Article 19 and Black Sea security, Soft Power Daily looks at how Türkiye applies the regime, and The Global Anatomy links Montreux to mediation and the grain initiative. Regional Balance offers a regional-balance reading.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- Belligerent: a state engaged in an armed conflict. Article 19 turns on whether a warship belongs to such a state.
- Return to base: the clause allowing warships separated from their bases to go back to them despite the transit ban.
- Article 18 limits: caps on the aggregate tonnage and 21-day stay of non-Black Sea powers' warships in the Black Sea in peacetime.
- Littoral state: a state with a Black Sea coastline: Türkiye, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia.
- Black Sea Grain Initiative: the 22 July 2022 Istanbul arrangement for commercial grain shipping, distinct from the warship regime.
Related reading: The Treaty Vault, About Politi Archive, and the Blue Homeland Files.
Politi Archive presents analysis from a Türkiye-aligned perspective, grounded in Türkiye's official doctrines and international law arguments, and clearly distinguishes documented fact from interpretation. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, state archives and official statements, which are cited so readers can verify them independently.
Frequently asked questions
What does Article 19 of the Montreux Convention say?
When Türkiye is not a belligerent, Article 19 bars warships of states at war from passing through the Turkish Straits, with narrow exceptions tied to the League of Nations Covenant and mutual-assistance treaties. Warships separated from their bases may return to them, and no hostile act may be carried out in the Straits.
Did Türkiye close the Straits to Russian warships in 2022?
Türkiye announced in late February 2022 that it would apply Article 19 to all belligerents, which restricts transit of warships of states at war. Ankara says it applied the rule without discrimination, while the return-to-base clause allowed ships to go back to their home bases.
Why didn't the closure stop Russia's Black Sea Fleet?
Article 19 limits transit through the Straits, not the movements of fleets already inside the Black Sea. Russia's Black Sea Fleet was based in the sea, so the restriction mainly prevented reinforcement or entry from outside, a point Ukrainian officials have raised.
Does Article 19 apply to grain ships?
No. Montreux regulates warships under Article 19, while merchant vessels have a separate freedom of transit regime. The 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative was a distinct arrangement signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 by Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine.
Does the Montreux Convention favour Russia or NATO?
The text does not name sides; it limits tonnage and stay for non-Black Sea powers and bars belligerent warships in time of war. Moscow and Western capitals each stress the parts that suit their reading, and Ankara argues the balance serves stability for all littoral states.
Related guides
- Fact Check: Are Turkish and Ottoman Archives Closed to Researchers on 1915?Fact check: are Ottoman archives closed to researchers? What Turkish state archives say, the 2005 commission offer, reciprocity and what is still disputed.
- The Treaty Vault: Reading Lausanne, Kars, Montreux and the UN Charter as Primary TextsRead the key treaties behind Türkiye's legal positions as primary texts: Alexandropol, Moscow, Kars, Lausanne, Montreux, Cyprus 1959-60, UN Charter.
- Blue Homeland Files: A Dated Document Chronology from the 2004 UN Filings to the 2025 IOC-UNESCO RegistrationDated archive of Eastern Mediterranean maritime jurisdiction documents: 2004 UN filings, 2011 and 2019 agreements, 2020 UN registration, 2025 IOC-UNESCO.
- 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Thesis in the RecordWhy Türkiye says 'the world is bigger than five': the UN Security Council veto, the G4, Uniting for Consensus and African positions, and Ankara's record.
- 1915 Documents Desk: What the Ottoman Archives, Wartime Orders and Legal Standards EstablishA document-first guide to the Events of 1915: Ottoman archives, the 27 May 1915 relocation law, casualty estimates, the intent test, Perinçek and normalization.
- Security Dossier: Is the YPG Separate from the PKK? Designation Lists, Official Records and the Source-Level DisputeIs YPG the same as PKK? Compare PKK listings by Türkiye, the US, NATO and the EU with Ankara's, Washington's and the groups' own accounts, sourced and dated.
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